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The inability of current machines to expose biases induced
by programmers and data scientists is leading towards the
creation of a new religion, where machines are mystic oracles
whose pronouncements have to be believed, and computer
users are their servants.
This has to change.
In this paper we discuss the issues that can raise from bi-
ases introduced in autonomous systems, with specific care of
the case of machine learning systems, and their impact on our
society. In the light of the (current and future) exploitation of
autonomous systems for law enforcement and war-fighting,
we emphasise the importance of issues related to discrimi-
nation and safety. We also support the bold claim that arti-
ficial intelligence can help artificial intelligence in overcom-
ing those issues: by enabling artificial intelligence to record
every single step that lead to a given inference, and to argue
with humans, we can unveil the mystic oracle and trust its
services.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Argumentation, AI and
Society
Introduction
Indisputably, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is already
strongly affecting our lives and our society. AI ap-
proaches are exploited in a wide range of applica-
tions, such as: for understanding and driving con-
sumer behaviour,1 for supporting decision-makers and
the decision-making process, for fostering creativ-
ity,2 or for identifying suspicious behaviours. Despite
the widespread presence of AI in our society, it is
well-known that, thanks to advances in computational
power and in to the optimisation of the approaches,
the exploitation of AI-based techniques is steeply ris-
ing. However, machines—as we learnt to know them
in these early years of the 21st century—are as biased
as their programmers [6]. Moreover, differently from
(some) humans, machines lack the ability to expose
and discuss their biases. This is raising significant con-
cerns on the impact of machines on human activities3
and society organisation,4 to mention a few. That is be-
cause, arguably, using a machine without knowing in
the minimal details the way it has been programmed, is
similar to ask a mystic oracle whose pronouncements
have to be believed by faith [23].
This has to change.
Research has already been carried out for unveil-
ing part of such a mystic oracle, thanks also to events
like the Workshop on Human Interpretability in Ma-
chine Learning5 or the Workshop on Explainable Arti-
1http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/
christmas/bot-until-you-drop-a7477406.html (on
29/05/2017)
2https://singularityhub.com/2017/02/06/
art-in-the-age-of-ai-how-tech-is-redefining-our-creativity/
(on 29/05/2017)
3https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/
09/robots-taking-white-collar-jobs (on 29/05/2017)
4https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/
13/artificial-intelligence-ai-abuses-fascism-donald-trump
(on 29/05/2017)
5https://sites.google.com/site/2016whi/ (on
29/05/2017)
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ficial Intelligence.6 Remarkable contributes from such
events include the work of Lipton [19], which pro-
vides a refined definition of interpretability of predic-
tive models, and the work from Krause et al. [17] that
introduces visual techniques for interpreting some type
of predictive models. On a similar line of research,
Letham et al. [18] presented a methodology for de-
riving accurate predictive models that also human ex-
perts can interpret. Their approach lies on decision
lists, which consist of a series of if-then statements
that transform high-dimensional, multivariate feature
spaces into a series of simple, readily decision state-
ments.
Research like [18,17] is clearly more than welcome,
but it does not solve all the issues associated to us-
ing such a mystic oracle. As we will develop further
in Section , the mystic oracle relies on various com-
ponents, each of those plays a specific role, and may
very well be affected by human biases or mischievous
actions. For example, what would happen if an au-
tonomous system for detecting suspicious activities,
that might lead to searches and seizures by the police,
is trained on a specific dataset where most of the train-
ing cases labelled as suspicious activity show a male,
black individual? Would the autonomous system infer
that the gender and the skin colour are relevant fea-
tures? And what would happen if such a system be-
comes widely used in policing actions? Under the UK
law, every individual can be stopped and searched if
policemen have “reasonable grounds” for suspicious
activities.7 In the USA, the fourth amendment pro-
vides “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”8
Would such an autonomous system be used for pro-
viding “reasonable grounds” or “probable cause” for
searches, or seizures? We, the researchers in Artificial
Intelligence, have the moral obligation to educate the
society on the issues that may raise when using au-
tonomous systems, and in Section we explore some of
those issues.
Indeed, the goal of this paper is twofold: on the one
hand, we want to raise the awareness of these issues
within the ACM community and with the general pub-
6http://home.earthlink.net/˜dwaha/research/
meetings/ijcai17-xai/ (on 29/05/2017)
7http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/
contents (on 29/05/2017)
8https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1408042 (on
29/05/2017)
lic. On the other hand, we aim to discuss a reasonable,
methodological pathway for addressing these issues.
Our belief is that artificial intelligence can help artifi-
cial intelligence to overcome (some of) those issues,
and we discuss it at length in Section . Finally, we con-
clude the paper with general discussions and conclu-
sion in Section .
The Mystic Oracle
Diakopoulos [7] describes a generic autonomous
agent on the basis of five main components: human
involvement and accountability; data used as input;
model for manipulating the input; inferencing and is-
sues associated to accuracy; and algorithmic presence
as the impact that might have on the ultimate user
knowing that the given inference has been curated by
an autonomous agent. Although these elements are rel-
evant for many types of AI approaches, in this paper we
will consider mostly the case of machine learning sys-
tems because of their massive diffusion and exploita-
tion.
Formally, a computational system is said to learn
from experience E, with respect to some class of tasks
T and performance measure P, if its performance at
tasks in T , as measured by P, improves with experience
E [21].
Practically, machine learning approaches generate
predictive models on the basis of experience gained
by analysing a provided training data set. Training in-
stances are described through some available observed
characteristics (features). The training set is, by as-
sumption, representative of the population on which
the trained model will be exploited. There exists a wide
range of techniques for generating predictive models—
such decision trees, neural networks, support vector
machines, etc.—but they all try to identify some sort of
patterns in the values of the features of the given train-
ing examples, that allows to provide accurate predic-
tions. It shall be noted that the type of features (e.g.,
continuous values, classes, etc.), as well as the type of
prediction, has a strong impact on the algorithms for
generating predictive models.
Figure 1 depicts the above mentioned five compo-
nents introduced by Diakopoulos [7], and the interac-
tions among them that we will consider in this paper. It
is beyond doubt that, in machine learning approaches,
a model is derived from data, and leads to a series of in-
ferences. Moreover, human is usually –but not always–
involved in the process of selecting relevant data/for-
F. Cerutti et al. / Unveiling the Oracle 3
1010101
0101101
1110001
0101010
1010100
1010101
0101101
1110001
0101010
1010100
0101
101101
1 10001
01 1010
1010100
λ
λ
π
Data Model Inferencing
Algorithmic
PresenceDirect Human Involvement
Fig. 1. Fundamental components of an autonomous agent: a kite-level picture.
malism to be used, as well as the general model to
be used in a specific scenario, e.g. Bayesian network
vs neural network, etc. Finally, algorithmic presence is
clearly determined by the use or not of a given model.
The Veiled Oracle
With reference to Figure 1, we argue that biases and
mischievous actions can affect each of the five compo-
nents. However, given the venue for this paper, we will
abstain from discussing how biases can be originated
in humans, therefore we will look more closely at the
selection of data, the choice of model, the quality of
inferencing, and at the effect of algorithmic presence.
Data and Model
First of all, it is worth remember here that each au-
tonomous system “is limited in making its predictions
to analysis of the data within its dataset, and it cannot
consider other facts that might be relevant but that were
not included. In contrast, human beings are always at
least potentially capable of including a new piece of
relevant information in an analysis” [29].
Bearing in mind such caveat, Citron and Pasquale
[6] discuss predictive algorithms assessing risks, de-
sirable employees, reliable tenants, etc. However, they
specifically highlight how datasets may contain “in-
accurate and biased information.” Indeed, as noted
by van Eijk [35], criminologists and legal scholars
have criticised risk assessment tools for their potential
bias against racial/ethnic minorities and women, which
could result in sentencing disparities, e.g. [14,4,32]. As
noticed by Skeem and Lowenkamp [32], criminal his-
tory mediates the relationship between race and future
arrest.
Those are evidence of possible implicit discrimina-
tion, which can be of three types: masking, subcon-
scious discriminatory motivations, and relying upon
tainted datasets or tools [42]. The first type collects all
mischievous activities aimed at making discriminatory
practices in a way in which discrimination might prove
undetectable or at least defensible [2].
With regards to the second type, Citron and Pasquale
[6] highlight how “human beings [. . . ] biases and
values are embedded into the [. . . ] predictive algo-
rithms,” thus giving rise to subconscious discrimina-
tion. For instance, as reported by Friedmanand Nis-
senbaum [10], the National Resident Match Program
(NRMP)9 implements a centralised method for as-
signing medical school graduates their first employ-
ment following graduation in USA. The original al-
gorithm was designed at a time where there were
very few couples—both partners graduates from med-
ical school—involved. In late 1970s, more women en-
tered medical schools and thus more married couples
sought medical appointments though the NRMP. At
this point, it was discovered that the original admis-
sions algorithm placed married couples at a disadvan-
tage in achieving an optimal placement, as compared
with their single peers [30].
Finally, Zarksy [42] discusses at length how dis-
criminatory outcomes are generated by “recklessly—
or perhaps, mere negligently—relying upon tainted
datasets.” It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss
the subtle distinction between reckless and negligence.
However, this is perhaps the simplest case of bias a
computer or data scientist encounters. Is the dataset
9http://www.nrmp.org/ (on 29/05/2017)
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representative enough? Are we applying a model vio-
lating the assumptions behind its training?
This naturally raises questions about accountabil-
ity of the human involvement. Discussions around this
theme now dominate chronicles, and examples include
autonomous cars, and more dangerously autonomous
weapons. On 28th July 2015, at the opening of the In-
ternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
in Buenos Aires, Argentina, an open letter was pub-
lished10 to join the Human Right Watch11 in asking
for a ban on the development of autonomous weapons.
As stated in the Human Right Watch’s document, “the
use of fully autonomous weapons raises serious ques-
tions of accountability, which would erode another es-
tablished tool for civilian protection. Given that such a
robot could identify a target and launch an attack on its
own power, it is unclear who should be held responsi-
ble for any unlawful actions it commits.”
Inferencing and Algorithmic Presence
When faced with the result of an algorithmic pro-
cedure, people often experience “automation bias,”
which is “the tendency to trust an automated system,
in spite of evidence that the system is unreliable, or
wrong in a particular case” [1]. Moreover, Kirkpatrick
[16] discusses legal implications that can arise when an
autonomous system is used in risk assessment of a sus-
pect. In July 2016 the Wisconsin Supreme Court sen-
tenced that warnings must be attached to the scores to
flag such a system’s “limitation and cautions”.12
The way Rich [29] analyses the result of an infer-
ence produced by an autonomous agent is to consider
it at the same level of an informant, in that they are
outside of a law enforcement and provide informa-
tion about criminal activity. Informants can be divided
in: (1) criminal informants; (2) anonymous tipsters;
and (3) citizen-informants [39]. Criminal informants
generally ask in exchange money or leniency. Anony-
mous tipsters do not disclose identifying information.
Citizen-informants provide information by virtue of
being the victim of or witness to a crime.
Rich [29] argues that an autonomous system would
not seat in any of these three traditional categories.
10https://futureoflife.org/
open-letter-autonomous-weapons/ (on 29/05/2017)
11https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/
losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots (on
29/05/2017)
12https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/opinion/
DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=171690 (on
29/05/2017)
In one sense, autonomous systems’ designers are like
citizen-informants. However, like anonymous infor-
mants, the designers almost certainly will not be sub-
ject to criminal prosecution if a prediction is wrong.
Moreover, a designer is motivated (at least in part) by
money.
Finally, even if a legal framework for handling infor-
mation coming from an autonomous system was avail-
able, a more serious issue still stands, namely the dif-
ficulty that most humans have to fully understand un-
certainty. For instance, Gigerenzer [13] discusses at
length the fact that even physicians are often confused
about the notions of sensitivity and specificity, and
their effect on conditional probabilities. Although no
systematic studies of effects on patients exists, there
are anecdotal reports of people with HIV false-positive
test results who: engaged in unprotected sex with HIV-
positive people believing that it would not matter any-
more; committed suicide; and endured harmful effects
of unnecessary antiretroviral treatments [12].
Unveiling the Oracle
Our main claim is that most of—if not all—the is-
sues highlighted in Section can be addressed building
on top of existing artificial intelligence techniques. At
the same time, it is beyond the scope of this limited pa-
per to show complete solutions to those issues. Rather,
we choose to consider a sub-field in artificial intelli-
gence, namely argumentation theory, and look at how
it would help in addressing those issues.
Argumentation theory sits in the intersection of three
major lines of research: informal logic, philosophy,
and non-monotonic reasoning. Stephen Toulmin in his
book The Uses of Argument criticised traditional stud-
ies in deductive reasoning and logic. This lead him to
introduce a warrant for each line of reasoning allow-
ing for rebutting such a line of reasoning when specific
circumstances happened thus affecting the warranty.
Other works on rebuttals were influential for John Pol-
lock, who migrated from philosophical studies to artifi-
cial intelligence in order to formalise the intuitive con-
cept of defeasible reasoning, now at the hearth of ar-
gumentation theory. Finally, argumentation theory bor-
rows largely from the field of non-monotonic reason-
ing, especially for what concerns reasoning systems:
the first systems were heavily based on logic program-
ming.
The field is now start testing the claim that argumen-
tation theory “captures naturally the way humans argue
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to justify their solutions to many social problems” [8].
Recentely, an argumentation-based system has been
used to aggregating clinical evidence on lung cancer
treatments [40], taking into account subjective crite-
ria such as preferences over outcome indicators. More-
over, experiments with human participants are carried
out, and projects are proposed to apply argumentation
theories to a large variety of aspects related to hu-
man cognition. For instance, Framework for Compu-
tational Persuasion13 is a project under development
to build a framework for computational persuasion to
support behaviour change using knowledge representa-
tion and reasoning techniques, together with computa-
tional models of argument, to offer an argument-based
approach to persuasion.
Background in Argumentation Theory
Since the oracle we want to unveil is, unquestion-
ably, a logical one, let us focus on logical aspects of
argumentation brilliantly summarised by Chesn˜evar et
al. [5] in their survey paper to which we refer interested
readers.
Formal logic of arguments emerged in the last 30
years as one style of formalising non-monotonic rea-
soning which differentiates from classical logic for its
ability to deal with incomplete and potentially incon-
sistent information [20]. Among other founding fathers
of argumentation theory, Pollock [27] moved his the-
ory of defeasibily—originally used within epistemol-
ogy to address questions of justification—into com-
puter science, developing a theory of defeasible rea-
soning. In his view [27], reasoning proceeds by con-
structing arguments based on reasons that can be ei-
ther conclusive—i.e. non defeasible—or prima facie—
i.e. that create a presumption in favour of their conclu-
sion but they can be defeated. Pollock was a strenuous
supporter of statistical generalisation and thus, there
should be little surprise in reading that “a rational agent
must be equipped with rules (1) enabling it to form be-
liefs in statistical generalisations, and (2) enabling it to
make inferences from those statistical generalization to
beliefs about individual matters of fact” [27, p. 59].
Pollock’s work was very influential for a large part
of the argumentation community, who started building
rule-based systems incorporating the distinction be-
tween defeasible and strict, i.e. non defeasible, rules,
e.g. [37] among others. Although a logical language
13http://www.computationalpersuasion.com/ (on 7th May
2017)
is often used to express such rules, Walton et al. [38]
considered the more informal concept of argumenta-
tion scheme as a reasoning pattern aimed at supporting
the acceptance of a conclusion. This line of research
benefited from Dung’s theory [8] that abstracts from
the inner structure of arguments focusing only on de-
featers (or attackers) for deriving criteria to determine
set of arguments that are collectively acceptable, i.e.
that collectively survive the attacks they receive. In this
context, criteria are referred to as semantics.
Argumentation and Data
From our perspective, issues highlighted in Section
with regards to data belong to two classes that can be
summarised by two questions: are we using the right
information? And, are we using quality data?
As per the first question, the issue is far from be-
ing settled. In more computational terms it can be
rephrased as: what are the criteria of adequacy of logi-
cal formalisation of natural language statements? [26].
In this respect, there are two main schools of thoughts,
one promoting atomism, the other reflective equilib-
rium. The former one, advocated for instance in [3],
suggests that the adequacy of a formalisation of a sen-
tence does not depend on formalisation of other sen-
tences. The latter, advocated for instance in [26], ar-
gues that formalisation is inherently a holistic endeav-
our. We believe that this question should be settled for
the sake of artificial intelligence, leaving aside bene-
fits for the philosophy of logic. Having clear criteria
to use for testing the quality of formalisation and thus
answering the question are we using the right informa-
tion? is of primary importance.
The second question—i.e. are we using quality
data—highlights the need of confidence in evidence-
based reasoning.14 To this end, Fox [9] contends that a
theory of arguing about evidence should have ten prop-
erties:
1. it should follow an argumentation process con-
structing reasons for/against competing claims;
2. evidential arguments should increase/reduce con-
fidence in claims;
3. ceteris paribus, the more independent and sound
arguments for a given claim, the greater our con-
fidence in such a claim;
14Unless alternative facts https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=VSrEEDQgFc8 (on 29/05/2017) are preferred to ground inferenc-
ing
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4. a single argument can be conclusive for confirm-
ing or refuting a claim;
5. arguments and theories can themselves be ques-
tioned;
6. some arguments can be stronger than others;
7. in the absence of information about relative strength,
contradictory arguments still play an important
role in decision making;
8. it is desirable to develop systems using sound, for-
mal languages for argumentation but that can be
translated to and from intuitive natural language
interfaces;
9. a rational agent can choose the hypothesis that
has the greatest confidence among all the compet-
ing hypotheses, unless there are grounds to argue
against such a confidence;
10. a rational agent not forced to choose may defer
a decision on the grounds that the arguments are
unwarranted.
To this end, the CISpaces tool [34] is, to our knowl-
edge, the most advanced attempt to satisfy most of
those properties. It supports intelligence analysts in
their sense-making activities exploiting argumentation
schemes [38] for building arguments, thus satisfying
the first property, as well as supporting critical think-
ing. Moreover, CISpaces allows analysts to inspect
the provenance of data, recorded using the PROV-
DM model15 thus supporting strength—in the form of
preferences—in favour of different claims based on ev-
idence (second, third, and sixth properties) and ensur-
ing accountability. Moreover, it builds on top of AS-
PIC+ [28] and uses Dung’s preferred semantics [8],
and thus satisfies the fourth and seventh properties.
CISpaces does not allow to express arguments against
the argumentation schemes used—although we are not
aware of approaches in that direction that seems to us
borderline with the first question above, i.e. are we us-
ing the right information?—and it does not have a nat-
ural language interface. Regarding the last two prop-
erties, CISpaces is not aimed at replacing the human
decision maker, rather to support them, therefore the
burden of the decision is left always on the shoulders
of the rational agent who can choose the hypothesis
that has greatest confidence, or defer the decision, thus
suggesting that more information might be needed.
15http://www.w3.org/TR/prov-dm/ (on 29/05/2017)
Listing 1: An example of Bayesian Rule Lists from
[18, Fig. 3]. In parentheses is the 95% credible interval
i f h e m i p l e g i a and age > 60
s t r o k e r i s k 58.9% (53.8%−63.8%)
e l s e i f c e r e b r o v a s c u l a r d i s o r d e r
s t r o k e r i s k 47.8% (44.8%−50.7%)
e l s e i f . . .
Argumentation and Model
Letham et al. [18] present a machine learning sys-
tem where the inferencing step is based on a deci-
sion list that is mined from data. This reflect, in spirit,
[15], where Holte argues that there are cases in which
the accuracy of rules that classify examples on the ba-
sis of a single attribute is sometime higher than other
more complex approaches. Letham et al. [18] show that
their Bayesian Rule Lists (BRL) aims at hitting “the
sweet spot between predictive accuracy, intrepretabil-
ity, and tractability” by providing (1) more accurate re-
sults than SVM, Random forests, and others systems,
on the task of predicting stroke risk on real data; and
(2) and interpretable model of the form of the one in
Listing 1.
Although Listing 1 already provides a fairly un-
derstandable prediction model, there are two main is-
sues that need to be addressed. The first one is to ex-
plain the meaning of those percentages, and to this
aim we believe that the discussion on provenance we
had in Section is very relevant in this context as well.
For instance, knowing the details of the chosen train-
ing dataset would be extremely relevant to understand
whether the prediction can actually apply to the given
case.
The second issue is how an expert can interact with
the system in order, perhaps, to correct the mined
model or to ask questions such as “what if. . . .” This
should not be considered as a minor detail. Indeed, Cit-
ron and Pasquale [6] highlighted this as one of the main
requests in medical and legal domain—a requirement
if you want, given that barristers and physicians are
among the most important stakeholders of data mining.
While we are not aware of any approach in argu-
mentation aimed at addressing what-if analysis—an
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area that we believe should be definitely subject of
future studies—argumentation community addressed
other elements of interaction with machine learning
systems. Notably, Mozˇina et al. [22] combine machine
learning with experts’ arguments or reasons for some
of the learning examples thus constraining the com-
binatorial search among possible hypotheses. We be-
lieve that it would be very beneficial to further investi-
gate connections with [18]. Moreover, in the context of
the RoboCup, Gao and Toni [11] present a way for ex-
perts to provide knowledge in the form of heuristics to
a system for reinforcement learning. It would also be
clearly very beneficial to investigate further how this
might link in the context of active learning [31]—i.e.
where an active learner may question a human expert
that already understands the nature of the problem.
Argumentation and Inferencing
To exemplify an inferencing case, let us consider the
case that a Bayesian network—a directed acyclic graph
where nodes represents stochastic variables, and ar-
rows dependencies that can be specified by the means
of conditional probabilities—has been used by an au-
tonomous agent as a model to make predictions. That
is, the posterior probability of a specific variable in a
Bayesian network is derived on the basis of evidence.
The question is how such an inferencing step can be
explained to a human agent.
In a recent paper, Timmer et al. [33] discuss an
approach to derive explanatory arguments from a
Bayesian network. Pivotal in their work is the notion
of a support graph constructed for a variable of inter-
est that captures the support the variable of interest re-
ceives from the other variables. Then, once evidence is
provided, the support graph is used to derive arguments
that describe the logical steps needed to interpret the
Bayesian judgement of the variable of interest.
Despite Timmer et al. [33] seem not to be aware of
[18], it is almost immediate to draw parallels between
the two approaches: the Bayesian Rule List derived us-
ing [18] seems to represent a very specific type of sup-
port graph. The main difference is that in [18] the in-
ferencing step is provided by the Bayesian Rule List
itself, rather than an underlying Bayesian network.
However, both [33] and [18] suffer from the lack
of empirical evaluation of the quality of their expla-
nations with human judges. This has been the sub-
ject of [25], where it is shown that Causal Explanation
Tree [24] and Most Relevant Explanation [41] mod-
els provide better fits to human data. This is encour-
aging especially because, intuitively, Causal Explana-
tion Trees seem expressive enough to capture Bayesian
Rule Lists.
Argumentation and Algorithmic Presence
In Section we reported that Rich [29] would con-
sider autonomous agents at the same level of infor-
mants. Assuming that an autonomous agent can also
provide a confidence interval (cf. for instance List-
ing 1), then this should be the case when the confi-
dence in the answer is low.16 However, there are situa-
tions where the inferences produced by an autonomous
agent are significantly accurate, and thus they would
appear more like an expert opinion. However, while
human experts are often allowed “to draw on their own
experience and specialised training to make inferences
from and deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that might well elude an untrained
person”17 without the need to prove the soundness of
the reasoning behind their inferences and deductions,
this should not be allowed for an autonomous agent.
For instance, we can build on top of Walton et al.
[38] schemes for argument from witness testimony and
from expert opinion to derive the following scheme for
evidencing and questioning the algorithmic manipula-
tion of a piece of information we received:
Argument from Autonomous Inferencing
Major Premise: A is an autonomous system trained in
subject domain S containing proposition P.
Minor Premise: A asserts that proposition P is true (or
false).
Conclusion: P is true (or false).
Critical questions
CQ1: What are A’s maker interests?
CQ2: Is A’s assertion internally consistent?
CQ3: Is A training adequate to make a judgement
about P?
CQ4: Is the provenance of A’s judgement about P
sound?
CQ5: Is A’s assertion consistent with the known fact
of the case (based on evidence independent from
A)?
16How to label a numeric value as low is not trivial. A confidence
interval of 20%–30% might be low if we are contemplating the risk
of rain in London; but it might be very high if it is the risk of a
terrorist attack in New York
17https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/
534/266 (on 29/05/2017)
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CQ6: Is A’s assertion consistent with other, indepen-
dent autonomous systems’ assertions?
In particular, to minimise the “automation bias”
highlighted by Asaro [1] and to ensure accountabil-
ity, we strongly believe that no information provided
by an autonomous system should be accepted until all
the critical questions have been successfully addressed.
This will then require to record: eventual conflict of
interest with the individual of company that created
the autonomous system; the internal consistency of the
system; the dataset(s) used for training; all the steps
that went from the data collection of the dataset, to
the generation of the model, to the collection of data
specifically used for prediction, to the inferencing step.
Finally, we believe it should be enforced the general
principle that every piece of information requires con-
firmation from multiple independent sources before
being accepted.
Discussion
The great challenge of Artificial Intelligence is “to
understand the nature of intelligence and cognition so
well that computers can be made to exhibit human-like
abilities” [36, Preface].
We argue that Artificial Intelligence can go beyond
enabling computer to exhibit everyman-like abilities
such as driving a car: it can enable computers to col-
laborate with us at the highest scientific standards. In
fact, research is currently being carried out for inves-
tigating how AI can be exploited for evolving some of
the most pivotal human society processes, such as the
democratic process,18 and for addressing difficult so-
cial problems.19
To successfully achieve that, we believe an holistic,
homogeneous approach that addresses all the compo-
nents depicted in Figure 1 of an autonomous system
is not only desirable: it is necessary. Several pieces of
research already addressed many of those components
separately: it is now necessary to connect the dots, to
draw the big picture, and to evaluate it by the means of
extensive experimentation with a large variety of hu-
man subjects.
There lies before us, if we choose, a continual
progress and benefit in this fourth industrial revolu-
tion with true human-machine collaborations. Other-
wise, we risk the rise of a new religion where ma-
18https://linkeddemocracy.com/ (on 29/05/2017)
19http://cais.usc.edu/ (on 29/05/2017)
chines are mystic, veiled, ubiquitous oracles, and their
pronouncements and decisions will have just to be ac-
cepted. Until a new revolution.
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